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credit system.  Early extensions of farmers'  leases on state-
owned land would reassure farmers about the government's  ;
commitment to the present system.
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After 20 years oi colleclivization, China's  tion with issues of farm size and consolidation
agricultural sector was reformned  in the last  are unwarranted. The production gains from
decade.  Individual fami/household units re-  consolidation would be limited and the costs
placed collective production. Households were  substantial.
given individual leases on forner  commune land
first for 3-5 years, but now for 15 years, and  Where farms are tiny, farm size is a problem
even longer for tree crops.  --  but coercing consolidation or recollectiviza-
tion would be harmful.  It would be preferable to
Household data on1  four areas in China in  introduce institutional mechanisms and proce-
1987-88 revealed pattems of spending on1  dures to facilitate market-induced land transac-
productive assets, durable consumer goods, and  tions. More mobility of labor would also help.
housing.
Concems about the inadequacy of invest-
Using a model of household production and  ment finance for agricultural households are not
investment decisions, Feder, Lau, Lin, and Luo  yet justified in areas where the supply of such
analyzed data on several factors that had been  production inputs as fertilizer is unsatisfactory.
thoughit  to inhibit investment in farm capital and  But once the input supply system improves,
encourage residential or other nonfarm invest-  limited credit will become a constraint - and
ments: the typically small size of farms together  the rural credit system, which is geared to rural
with increasing retunis !o scale in production;  industry and commerce, will have to be
inadequate credit; and farmers' perceptions of  reoriented.
insecurity because of possible policy shifts
during the life of their leases on state-owned land  Radical revision of the land tenure system is
or the likelihood of being assigned other lands  not called for as the land Ieasing system seems
when the contract matures.  not to be hampering investment.  But likely
crosion of investment incentives will be averted
What were the policy implications of the  if leases are extended before they mature,
study results?  reassuring farmers about the government's long-
term commitment to the present system.
If the four study sites reflect the situation
elsewhere in China, policymakers' preoccupa-
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After  twenty years of  collectivized agriculture, China's  agricultural sector
underwent a major reform during the last  decade.  A key element of  the reform
was the introduction of  the "household responsibility system", which replaced the
collective  production mode by Individual farm household units.  Households  were
given control  over former commune  land through Individual  contracts  (Initially for
3-5  years, but presently for  15 years with even longer periods for  tree crops).
Asido  from  a  commitment  to  provide  certain  prespecifled  grain  quotas  at
government-set  prices, and the obligation to  pay taxes,  farmers now have the
freedom to  make cropping and Input  decislons, and are  allowed to  retain  any
profits  which they earn.
The Improved  Incentives brought about by the Institutional reform, combined
with  higher  prices  for  key  agricultural  products,  Induced an  unprecedented
acceleration of  agricultural growth In China.  Between 1979 and 1984 the  value
of  agricultural output  (In constant  prices) grew at an average of  7.5 percent per
year, mostly due to  Improved  incentives (Lin, 1988; McMIllan  et  al.,  1989).  After
1984, the  pace of  growth has slackened considerably, essentially because the
potential  gains due to  Improved Incentives under the  reformed structure  were
exhausted. Further growth thus depentJs  on the traditlonal sources of  agricultural
development, I.e., further  Investment In physical capital, expanded  material Input
supplies, and technological change.
In this context,  the analysis of  factors  affecting  farm Investment In China
Is of  much  policy relevance.  National data indicate that  along with the reform In
production organization, public sector  Investment In agriculture declined, In both
absolute  and relative  terms.  Agriculture's  share  In  the  government's capital-2-
construction  exr'nditure  fell from 12.5 percent  In 1979 to  4.6 percent  In 1986.
However, the  reintroduction  of  compulsory labor  services  for  maintenance of
irrigation  Infrastructure  was equlvalent to  more than half the state's  budget for
capital  construction  In agriculture  during  1987.  Information on  farmers'  farm
Investment Is scant,  but there  are some indications of  a response to  the stimull
provided by the reform:  In 1986 about 90 percent  of  the purchases of  walking
tractors,  and a  rapidly expanding share of  truck  purchases were by  Individual
farmers.  On-farm investment by farm households  has likely been substantial, but
It  Is not  clear to  what extent  It has been overtaken by  households'  expenditure
on  non-productive  assets  (consumer durables  and  housing)  and  non-farm
enterprises.
Whilo  the household  responsibility system stimulated production Incentives,
It can be argued that  concerns regarding the stability of  the land tenure system
introduced  by  the  reforms,  extremely small farm sizes, and credit  Inadequacies
hinder farm Investment, and may have caused a preference for  Investing In non-
productive  assets  (e.g.,  housing)  and  In  non-agricultural  activities.  Such
arguments have been raised quite frequently by observers of  Chinese  agriculture,
but  there  has been a paucity of  empirical  research to  assess their  validity and
importan^e
The c.,_Jective  of  this paper Is to  clarify,  on  the basis of  detailed farm
level  data  derived from recent  surveys,  the  importance of  factors  relatid  to
tenure  security,  farm  size  and  credit  availability  In  constralning  farmers'
agricultural Investment.  In particular,  a direct  measure of  farmers'  perceptions
regarding tenure  security  will be utilized, as well as  Information on transactions
In the credit market.  The next section provides a description of  the study areas.-3-
It  Is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  factors  affecting  farm  Investment and  a
description  of  Investment patterns  in  the  study  areas.  A  formal  model of
farmers' consumption  and Investment uecisions,  and an econometric analysis are
then  presented and results  are  Interpreted.  The last  section  summarizes  the
paper.
I1  DESCRPTION  OF STUDY  AREAS  AND  SURVEYS
The data underlying this study were obtained through recent  farm surveys
organized by the authors  In four  countries of  China: Gongzhullng  county  In Jilin
Province (December  1987).  Tal and .urong  counties  In Jiangsu Province (March
1988) and  Xlajlang county  In Jlar -,Al Province (November 1988).  The samples
consist  of  agricultural households, Ie.,  households operating farms as  a major
activity,  as distinct  from other rural households  which engage In commerce  or  are
mainly  employed  In rural Industry.
Gongzhullng county  Is  located  in  Jilin province  of  northeastern  China.
Agro-clknatic conditlons are such that  only one crop season Is feasible annually,
and corn  Is the major crop grown.  Farm  sizes In the  study  area In Gongzhuling
are  large relative  to  typlcal farms sizes In China, and the significant surplus of
output  over  consumption  requirements  makes the county  a leading corn  supplier
In China.
Tal and Jurong counties of  Jiangsu province are within the  Central East
China  region where a two-season wheat-rice cycle Is practiced annually. They are
characterized by  high population density and consequently have very  small farm
sizes.  Many farmers In these counties supplement  their Income  through off-farm-4-
employment (mostly  In  township or  village enterprises)  or  non-farm  business
activitles.
X1ljlang county  Is  located  In  Jiangxi province  of  Southern China where
double-cropping of  rice Is predominant. The county Is a major rice producer, witi
typical  farm sizes double that  of  Jiangsu province.  Farm fragmentatlon In the
study  areas  In Jilin and Jiangsu province  Is  less severe  than the  average for
China (which Is 9 tracts  per farm).  However,  In Xlajiang county  fragmentatlor, Is
a serlous problem,  (an average of  16 plots  per household)  and In Jiangsu tracts
are extremely small. Table 1 summarizes  some key characteristics  of  the samples
from the study  areas.
The fow  counties covered by the study were purposefully selected from
the  national sample  of  846 countles  which are surveyed  annually by  the  State
Statistical Bureau.  Each  of  the counties were deemed  typical of  the agro-clinatic
reglon In which  It Is located.  The samples  consisted of  severa  randomly  selected
townships within each county,  and within each township a  number of  ranooly
selected villages, with a total  sample  size of  about 200 farmers per county.  Both
Gongzhuling  and  Xlajlang are  surplus  grain  producing counties,  while Tal  and
Jurong, where population density  Is very  high, have less  grain surplus as  farm
sizes  area very  small.
Farmers were asked In the course of  Interviews to  provide information on
their  farm  operations,  assets  (at  present  and  In  the  past),  credit  markot
transactions,  and perceptions regarding tenure  security.Table  1:  Character'tics  of  Sample Farm Households
County  Gongzhullng  Tal  Jurong  Xlajlang
Item  (N-200)  (N-200)  (N1-199)  (N-200)
1  Mean farm  size  20.75  4.63  6.90  11.31
(Mu) a/
2.  Share of  Income  18  47  47  15
from  non-farm
sources
3.  Per  capita  Income  952  737  832  472  b/
In  1987/88  Yuan
4.  Mean No. of  land  3.7  7.05  4.90  16
parcels  per  HH
5.  Main crop  corn  wheat  (winter)  wheat  Irvter)  Rice (double
(single  season)  Rice (Summer)  Rice (o.  ier)  cropping)
a/  15  Mu - 1 hectare
_/  One  season  hi 1988 only-6
111.  FACTORS  POTENTIALLY  INHBITING  FAM  INVES1IENT
A.  Farm  size.  If productlon exhlbits Increasing  returns  to scale (at least within
the relevant range), then larger farms will tend to have larger capital/land ratios,
provided  that  supplies of  other  Inputs  or  credit  are  not  constrained.1  Put
differently,  with Increasing returns  to scale the consolidation of  farms would load
to  higher Investment and land productivity.  Farm  sizes In China  are typically small
even when  compared to  other Asian countries  (.55 hectare per household Is the
national average), and their  effective  size Is further  diminished  by fragmentation
(the national average Is about 9 parcels per farm).  Some  policy makers In China
argue that  the small  farm sizes brought about by the shift  Into household-based
production have hindered Investment, and have called for  partlal recollectivizatlon
and consolidation.
The  perception  of  Increasing returns  to  scale  relies  In  part  on  the
observation  that  some capital goods are  not  divisible (e.g. tractors  and draft
animals).  However, various arrangements have evolved In China's agriculture  to
circumvent  this proWem. In some  areas, communal  equipment  and draft  animals  have
been sold or  assigned to  selected households who committed to  provide draft
services to  other farmers at agreed rates.  In other areas, shared ownership  of
animals  and equipment  among  several households  Is practiced.
B.  Tenure securlty.  Under  the household  responsibility system, farmers do not
own the land, but have a lease protecting  their use rights for  the duration of  the
1  A  sufficient  condition  for  this  propositlon  to  hold when the  productlon  function  is
homogenous Is  that  Inputs  are  complementary  In  productijn  (i.e.,  positive  cross  second
derivatives).-7-
contract.  For most types  of  Investments, a duration of  15 years as practiced
at present  may be viewed  as sufficiently  long to  amortize animals  and equipment.
Uncertainty may however prevall In farmers' mind regarding the possibility that  a
change In government  pollcy (whether at  the central o.. ocal level) would lead into
a reallocation, before the contract  expires, of  some or all of  the land over which
they  hold a  contract.  If  some or  all of  the  land Is  taken  away, farmers with
excess capital may suffer  losses even If the capital Is mobile  (i.e., not  tled to the
land).  This Is because of  the transaction cost of  liquidating capital.  In addition
to  the risk of  reallocation of  land, farmers may be concerned about a possibility
of  a reversal of  the individualizdtlon  policy, leading to some form of  consolidation
and  collective  operation.  This possibility  entails  uncertainties  regarding  the
treatment  of  privately  owned production  capital.  The risks  outlined above can
diminish  the Incentive to  Invest In farming capital (e.g., equipment,  machinery  and
draft  animals),  but are less likely to  affect  Investment in livestock (pigs, poultry,
etc.)  as  these have a short  paycoff period and will most likely remain in private
ownership regardless of  policy changes.
Insights regarding farmers' tenure security perceptions can be derived from
responses to  specific questions pertalning to  the po3sibillty of  land reallocatlon.
These questions were Included In the f,lrvey  underlying the  present  study.  As
Indicated In Table 2,  In three  of  the  counties  studled,  only a  minority of  the
farmers perceive a hlgh likelihood  of  lanJ reallocation before the current  contract
expires.  In contrast,  in  Xlajlang county  three-quarters  of  the  farmers expect
land reallocation  before the contract  expires, I.e., a majority of the farmers In the
courty  do not have much  faith In authorities' commitment  to the present allocation.
This result  Is compatible  with the fact  that  the survey In Xlajlang county tookTable  2:  Farmers Perceptions  Regarding
Security  of  Tenure
County
Item  Gongzhullng  Tal  Jurong  Xlajiang
(N-200)  (N-200)  (N-199)  (N-200)










the  same farms
after  contract
expiration  date
place  much later  than  In the  other  counties  (November 1988).  By the  time of  the
survey,  there  have been several  well publicized incidents  In several  areas  of  China
durlng  the  second  half  of  1988  where  local  authorities  forced  consolidation  of
small farms.  The changed Insecurity  perceptions  In Xlajlang are  not  likely  to  have
had  an  impact  on  the  Investment  data  underlying  the  present  study,  as  these
pertain  to  the  poriod  1984-88.
A longer-term  perspective  underlies  the  responses  to  a question  regarding
the  likelihood of  being assigned  the  same traccs  of  land upon contract  expIration.
The majority  of  farmers  In all  counties  perceive  low  likelihood  of  regalning  use
rights  to  the  same tracts  of  land.  While the  risk  of  not  being  asslgned  the  same
parcels  of  land would clearly  have a negative  effect  on  land-embodied  Investment,-9-
It  may  also  hamper Investment In  mobile capital  (e.g.,  machines), because
uncertainty regarding re..location of plots can Imply  also uncertalnty regarding the
future  size of  the  farm and thus uncertainty regarding tPe marginal  productivity
of  capital once the  contract  explres.  However,  when there Is a relatively  long-
term land lease, concerns regarding future  farm size would not  have a  strong
kmpact on  Investment during the  first  years,  as  It  will be  fully  or  almost fully
depreclated by contract  expiration date.
Investment In housing Is viewed  by Chinese  farmers as completely  risk free,
because  hcuses  have been  privately  owned even In  the  years  of  collective
agriculture, and are likely to  remain  privately owned.  It sihould  be further  noted
that  housing Is a consumption  Item  with high Incc...  o elasticily.  The income  effect
Is augmented by  demographic  factors.  In China's rural areas,  a new house has
become  a precondition for  marriage  eligibility for  young males. With  the coming  of
age  of  Individuals born  In the  baby boom of  the  ear!y  60's,  the  demand for
housing has Increased.  These facts,  and the substantlal pent-up  demand  due to
the absence of  any significant housing Investment In the pre-reform  years could
produce a maJor  adJustment  In the housing stocK once Incomes  have rlsen and
private  construction  activities  have become  feasible.
C.  Finance Inadequacy  Credit constralnts  can be  another factor  Inhibiting
investment.  Most Investment  outlays (and housing Investment as well) ten,  to  be
lumpy, requirlng  a  substantlal  amount of  liquld resources.  Because of  this
lumpiness,  the necessary funds cannot typically be saved from one year's Income,
and long or  medlum-torm  credit,  or  accumulated  savings, are needed to  finance
Investment. Aggregate statistics  Indicate that the share of  medium  and long-term
loans In the portfolio  of  the rural credit cooperatives (the main  lending institutlon- 10  -
deallng with agricultiral  households) is a mere 3 percent (World Bank, 1988a, P.
258).  In the areas covered by the present study, the share of  short term loans
out  of  all Institutlonal  loans varles between 90 percent  and 100 percent  in the
four  counties  (Feder et  al.,  1989).  It  Is  possible, of  course,  to  finance
investment  by repeatedly rolling over short-term  loans.  In fact,  the structure  of
Interest  rates  In China  provided Incentives for  such a rollover,  as Interest  rates
on  short-term  production  loans were lower than Interest  rates  on medium-term
loans throughout the period under study  (World  Bank, 1988b, paper 7, annex 1,
Table 10).  However, short-term  loans are  typically granted  In smaller amounts.
Theoretically, when liquidity (and credit  in particular) Is  fungible, a shortage of
credit  would affect  all types  of  Investment (whether productive or  residential).
However,  deficiencies and segmentatlon  (by source and purpose) of credit markets
could create  a situation whereby  funds which  are available  for  housing Investment
cannot be used for  productive Investment.  An assessment of  the operation of
credit markets In rural Chins Is thus necessary In order  to  determine the role of
credit  constralnts  In explalning  the o!tserved Investment patterns.
Sources and uses of  credit  In the study areas are presented In Table 3,
which  describes the composition  of  loans undertaken by sample  farmers In the most
recent  season prior to  the Interview.  The boilk of  institutlonal credit Is declared
to  be  destined  for  production  (input  purchase)  as  Is  Indeed  Intended  by
government's policy.  However, most  Institutional  credit  Is  de-facto  fungible,
regardless of  the stated  objectives  for  which It  Is acquired, and It  Is likely that
short-term  production credit could be used to  finance Investment In farm capital
or  housing.  The extent to  which  rolled-over  short-term  Institutional  credit could
substitute  for  medium  and long-term funds  Is probably lknited, because amounts- 11  -
are typically small,  and the need to  repeatedly roll over  the loans Introduces an
element of  uncertainty  and Inconvenience.
In rural China,  non Institutional credit Is less likely to  be fungible, because
It  Is granted mostly free  of  Interest  by  relatives  and friends,  who have close
knowledge of  the  activities  and financial resources  of  the  borrowers.  Unlike
Institutional credit, which Is by-and-large  short-term,  Informal credit In the study
areas Is mostly medium  and long term, or has no definite maturity date (Feder et
al., 1989).  It Is likely that  relatives and friends are more Inclined to  lend money
for purposes of house construction and special social events (e.g. weddings)  which
are  perceived as  a  basic  need deserving assistance.  They are  less  likely to
provide Interest-free  loans for  agricultural Investment which Is  undertaken for
the purpose of  Increasing the borrower's Income. Table 3 Indlcates that  a higher
share  of  non-institutional  credit  Is  devoted  to  purposes  not  related  to
production,  and a  significant  proportion  of  It  Is used to  finance  constructlon
rather  than productive Investment. Because of  their  ability to monitor borrowers
activitles,  loans acquired from relatives  and friends  are typically  used for  the
specific  purposes for  which they were granted, and thus do not  add to  overall
liquidity.  It  Is  therefore  expected  that  Informal credit  Is  not  available as  a
significant source of  funding for  farm Investment In the study  areas.Table_3:  Distribution  of  Loan  Purposes  by
Type  of  Lender  (Percent)
Purpose  Sample  Production  Farm  Construction  Consumption  Social  Other
Size  Machinery  (Wedding,
Funeral,  etc)
County  and  (loans)
Source
Gmzning
Institutional  212  93.0  4.0  2.0  0  1.0  0
NMn-Institutional  47  11.0  4.0  23.0  15.0  26.0  21.0
Tai
Institutional  57  89.0  2.0  4.0  0  0  3.0
Nm-institutioral  25  36.0  0  32.0  0  20.0  12.0
Jurong
Institutional  29  48.0  10.0  10.0  3.0  10.0  19.0
Nm-Institutional  31  6.0  19.0  29.0  13.0  23.0  10.0
Xiajiang
Institutional  158  67.9  3.8  5.8  1.3  8.4  14.8
Nb-Institutional  85  33.8  1.5  28.0  9.2  20.0  9.5- 13  -
NI.  PATTERNS  OF  INVESTIENT  AND  EXPENDITURE  ON  HOUSING
AND  DURABLE!  iN THE  STUDY  AREAS
The Implementation  of  reforms In China's  agricultural sector  coincided with
other economic  changes  which  made  various consumer  goods more available  in both
urban and rural areas.  Thus the increased  Incomes  and savings could be used for
acquisitlon of  consumer  durables, an expense of  significant magnitude  relative  to
typical farm Incomes. Table 4 compares  ownership  of  several major consumer
durables (T.V.,radio/tape, bicycle, sewing machine,  watch) at  two  points  In time:
1983, which In the study areas was a year when  the new production mode  was at
Initial stages of  Implementation,  and 1988 (or  1987 In the  case of  Gongzhullng)
when  the reform was  well In place, and farmers had already benefitted from several
years  of  higher  Incomes.  All  Items show  significant  Increases.  The most
remarkable  change occurred In ownership  of  T.V.'s which  Increased  by hundreds of
percent  In all countles.  Consumer  durables are obviously private property  which
wl!l not  be affected  by  any changes In government's policies In the  agricultural
sector.
Investments In productive farm assets  have been substantlal,  compared
to  initlal levels of  capital In the study areas.  As demonstrated  In Table 5, capital
stocks  (livestock and equipment)  have more than doubled In the 4-5  year period
covered  by  the  data,  Implying annual growth  rates  of  capital  exceeding 15
percent.2  This  represents  significant  real  growth,  as  the  price  Index of
agricultural equlpment  rose  by  only  15 percent  over  the  whole pe lod  covered.
2 The survey covered several types of  land improvements,  such as clearlng of  stumps and
constructing bunds, but there was llttle  variatlon In the data as most of these Improvements  were
already undertaken before  the reforms.  Other types of  improvements  were difficult  to  quantify.- 14  -
As one  would expect,  the  highest  volume of  Investment  per  household  took  place
In Gongzhullng and  Xiajlang where farms  are  larger.
Table  4:  Changes In Ownership of  Consumer
Durables  in  Study  Areas
County,  Year  Gongzhullng  Jurong  Tal  Xlajiang
(N-200)  (N-199)  (N-200)  (N-200)
:em  1983  1987  1983  1988  1983  1988  1983  1988
Own 1.V.  6  42  11  38  2  26  5  48
Own radio/tape  3  14  2  17  2  12  34  44
g.  no.  of  .62  .98  1.14  1.33  1.10  1.43  1.02  1.26
bicycle
, own sewing  46  57  22  37  11  33  10  19
machine
=wn watch  64  83  68  94  53  91  59  82- 15  -
Table  5:  Cumulative Productive  Investment  In the
Period  1983-1988  a/  (sample means In Yuan)
County  Gongzhullng  Jurong  Tal  Xlajiang
Item  (N-200)  (N-199)  (N-200)  (N-200)
Crop-related  Investment
(i)  Tractor  309  139  0  95
(11)  Other  equlpment  173  82  42  127
(ill)  Draft  anknal  200  76  12  357
Sub-total  682  297  54  579
Other  Productive  Investment
(i)  Truck/boat  120  0  123  0
(ni)  Livestock  104  214  150  556
Sub-total  224  214  273  556
Total  Productive  Investment  906  511  327  1135
Total  productive  Investment  159%  127%  131%  107%
as  % of  initlal  capital
a/  Figures  for  Gongzhullng are  for  the  period  1983-1987,  while the  figures  for  other  counties  pertain
to  the  perlod  1984-1988.  The figures  are  undeflated.  The price  Index for  agricultural  equipment
Increased  by  15  percent  between  1983/4  and  1987/8.- 16  -
The composition  of  Investments  differs  across the countles studied.  Food
animals  (plgs, chicken) are a major component  of  investments In Xlajlang and Tal
county.  Draf  t  power (mechanized  or  anInial) composes over  one  half  of  the
Investment In Gongzhuling,  where farm sizes are  the  largest  among the  study
areas.  In Tal county,  where canals are numerous,  farmers Invest In boats (which
are used for transportation).  The figures reported for Investment  In tractors  and
trucks  may be misleading,  because tractors  are  expensive and they  raise  the
sample  mean  slgnlficantly even though only a few households  have acquired them.
For this reason It Is useful to observe the changes In the frequency of ownership
for  different  capital  Items, reported  In  Table 6.  It  Is  noted  that  even  In
Gongzhullng,  less  than  10 percent  of  the  households own tractors.  The most
common  form of  Investment Is  In pigs, which constitute  In all  counties  except
Gongzhullng  about  40-50  percent  of  productive Investment.
Investment In house construction or  housing Improvement  Is a major form
of  asset accumulation  for  farmers In China  (Tam,  1988).  Table  7 describes several
types  of  housing  knprovements  undertaken  by  sample farmers,  such  as  the
Installation of  tile  or  tin  roofs  Instead of  straw,  and the  replacement of  dirt
floors  by concrete.
Slgnificant Improvements  are observed In housing standards In all study areas, and
about  half of  the sampled  farmers Indicated that  they have Invested In housing
Improvement  or  expansion since  1983.  The volume  of  funds Invested In housing
Improvement  Is substantial.  On average, the outlay  on house Improvements  for
households undertaking such Improvements  was more than thelr  average annual
Income, exceeding productive  Investment by  a wide margin (last  llne In Table 7).
The share of  housing Investment In the total  outlay on productive Investment and- 17-
housing  knprovement  ranges  from  64  percent  In  Xlajlang  to  91  percent  in  Tal
county.
Some possible  reasons  for  the  heavy  Investment  In housing,  which are  not
related  to  any  of  the  factors  potentially  inhlbiting  productive  investment,  have
already  been  mentioned  In  sectlon  11  above  (e.g.,  demographic  trends  and  hlgh
Income  elasticity).  But  It  Is  also  possible  that  some of  the  factors  hampering
Incentives  for  productive  Investment  Induce  an  asset  composition  more  heavily
dominated  by  residential  capital  (e.g.,  limited  tenure  security,  segmented  credit
markets,  and  small farm  size).  These  Issues  need  to  be  Investigated  empirically,
but  prior  to  the  econometric  analysis  a  formal  model needs  to  be  presented  to
underly  the  empirical work.- 18  -
Table  6:  Changes In Productive  Assets
% Who Own  Gongzhullng  Tal  Jurong  Xlajlang
(N-200)  (N-200)  (N-199)  (N-200)
1983  1987  1983  1987  1983  1987  1984  1988
Tractor  1  9.5  0  0  3.5  8.0  4.0  5.5
Truck/boat  0  0.5  4.5  26.0  0  0  0  0
Pump engine  1  2  0  1.5  6  11.5  0.5  1.5
Thresher  0  3  0  0.5  2.5  12  92.0  97.0
Buffalo/oxen  5  19  0  3.0  53  77  94.5  92.5
Pigs  81  66  86.5  66.5  85  84.5  97.5  98.5
Other  anknals  15  30  .5  0  1.5  0  0.5  0.5
Average  value
per  household
(yuan)  a/  570  1476  250  577  403  914  1060  2195
a/  The values  are  not  deflated.  The price  Index for  agricultural  equipment rose  by  15 percent
between  1983/4  and  1987/8.- 19 -
Table  7:  kmprovements  In Housing
County,  Year  Gongzhullng  Jurong  Tal  Xiajlang
(N-200)  (N-199)  (N-200)  (N-200)
:em  1983  1987  1983  1988  1983  1988  1983  1988
with  non-straw  roof  22  51  94  98  51  85  99  99
with non-earth  floor  11  23  12  27  15  44  14  36
with non-earth  wall  22  48  85  95  51  85  69  80
who Invested  In housing  60  47  68  46
rovement  since  1983
g. size  of  housing
nvestment  (Yuan)  a/  4, 35  3,792  5,233  4,506
Ratio of  housing  Inprovement  2.71  3.57  10.88  1.82
nvestment  to  productive
nvestment  b/
I  Calculated  for  the  subsample of  Individuals with housing  klprovement.
Calculated  for  whole sample.- 20  -
V.  A Model of  Houseiold Consumption  and investment
Consider a  household maxlmizing  its  utility  over  a  two-period  planning
horizon.  Utility  Is  defined  over  a  composite consumption good  (C)  and over
housing services (H).  For simplicity, we assume  separability of  utillty.
T - UO(CO)  + Vo(Ho) + U1(Cj)  + V1(Hj)  (1)
where T  Is  total  utility.  U and V  are respectively  the  utilitles  from composito
consumption and housing  services,  and  the  numerical subscripts  denote  tine
perlods.  The time discount factor  Is omitted for  simplicity, as It can be embodied
In the definitlon of  U, and V1.
The household has an Initial endowment  of  financlal resources Wo,  which Is
augmented with borrowed funds L.  These resources  can  be used In the  first
period for  consumption  (Co), Investment in productive assets  (I) and Investment
In housing (h).  Other Initlal endowments  are capital (K0),  land (Ao) and housing
(Ho).  These are  assumed liliquld and cannot  therefore  be  used for  financing
consumption  or  Investment. The budget constraint  Is given by
W9 +  L  a  I +  h +  CO  (2)
In  the  second pe.-od, If  no  change In the  land endowment  occurs,  the
augmented capital stock  (that  Is,  Initial capltal plus  first  period  Investment) Is
combined wlth the  initlal  land endowment  to  produce output  via  a  neoclassical
production  function.  Consumption  In the  second  period  Is  then  the  value of
output  minus  the debt repayment. However,  If agriculture Is recollectivized or the
land Is  taken away (an event with probability P), then the  farmer receives only- 21  -
some fixed future  Income  Y, all debt Is cancelled, and production capital Is taken
over  by the  state.  3  Second period consumption  Is therefore
C 1 - F(Ko + l, Ao) - (1+r)*L  with probability 1-P  (3)
C 1 '  Y  with probability P  (4)
where F Is the production function  and r  Is the Interest  rate.
Maxuization of  the expected value of  utility  subject to  equations (2), (3),
(4) Is equivalent to
Max  UO(W 0+L-1-h)  + VO(HO)  + (1-P)  *  U1 l(F(K 0+l,Ao) - (1+r)#L)l
l,h  + P*U 1(Y)  + V,(Ho + h)  (5)
First order  conditions for  optimum  require
-U  + (1-P)  *  U;  *  Fk '  °  (6)
0
- UO + V; -O  (7)
where Fk Is the marginal  productivity  of  capital.
3 The model  could be formuWated  with a less extreme scenario wnereby  there Is a probability
of  losing only a portion  of  the  land and a portion of  capital.  While  the  mathematics  would be
more tedious, the results  wouWd  be skiilar.- 22  -
Comparative  statie  results  generated by  the  model are  summerized  In Table 8.
Proofs can be provided by the authors to  Interested readers.
Table 8:  Comparative  Statlc Results




Credit (L)  +  +
Rlsk (P)  *+
initlal Productive
Capital  (K)-  +
Initlal Housing (HO)  +
The effect  of  additional credit on both types of  Investn2ent  Is positive, as
one would expect when the  liquldity constraint  Is binding.  An Increased risk  to
land rights  will lead to  loss  farm Investment and higher residential Investment.
Higher Initial stocks  of  productive  capital and  housing have a  negative direct
effect  on Investment In these Items, but  positive cross-effects.
The effect  of  farm size  Is not  easy to  ascertain In the  context  of  the
present  model.  Typically a  larger  farm size  Is  also  associated  with a  larger
allocation of  credit, thus a ceteris paribus change of  farm size Is not meankigful.
it  can be shown that  If returns  to  scale are Increasing, or  If the marginal  utility
of  consumption Is relativoly non-elastic,  then  It Is more  likely that  farm size Is
mm ,  . _-  *- 23  -
positively  related  to  investment.  If  credit  and variable Input suppiles are  not
constrained (i.e., treating  L as a decislon varlable In the preceding mathematical
model),  then Increasing  returns  to  scale Imply  higher capital/land ratios.  However,
If some Inputs are fixed (e.g., rationed fertilizers)  and their supply Increases less
than propoetionately with farm size such that productlon is conducted under de-
facto  decreasing returns  to scale, then optimal  capital/land ratios will decline wlth
farm size  even If credit  Is not a constrairt.
VL  Econometric  Results
The fIrst  empirical  Issue which  needs to  be clarified relates to  returns  to
scale.  Proponents of  consolidation and recollectivization assume that  there  are
Increasing returns  to  scale In Chinese  agriculture.  Investment and productivity
would thus be enhanced  If typical farm sizes were larger.  In order to  estimate the
returns  to  scale In agricultural production within our  study  areas, conventional
Cobb-Douglas  production functions were estimated  (Table 9).  The output  In these
functions relates to crops but excludes livestock products, as livestock activities
(poultry  and plgs) are not  directly  related  to  farm size.  Corresponding to  this
notion of  output,  the measure  of  capital utilized includes the value of  equipment,
machinery  and draft  animals,  but excludes the value of  other  livestock.
The estimates indlcate that  In the two counties with larger farm holdings
(Gongzhuling  and Xlajlang), productlon can be characterized by  constant  returns
to  scale, as the sum of  productin  elasticities does not  differ  slgnificantly from
t  (line (g).  In the two counties with small  farm sizes (Tal and Jurong) returns  to
scale are statistically  significantly larger than 1.  Tal county, with the smallest- 24  -
Table  9:  Estkiates  of  Production  Functlons
(Cobb-Douglas  Specification)
County  Gongzhuling  Jurong  Tal  Xlajlang
Input  (N-200)  (N-190)  (N-200)  (N-196)
(a)  Land  .732*  .651 *  .661  *  .508*
(14.738)  (10.287)  (7.924)  (7.872)
(b)  Capital  .015*  .020  -.005  .067*
(1.816)  (1.345)  (.621)  (3.049)
(c)  Labor  .055  .2850  .393*  .263*
(1.279)  (4.735)  (5.216)  (4.625)
(d)  Nitrogen  .147*  .086*  .044  .131 *
(4.074)  (2.691)  (1.364)  (4.382)
(e)  Manure  .029*  .015  .018  .004
(2.592)  (1.190)  (1.056)  (.326)
(f)  R2 .921  .903  .945  .900
(g)  Returns  to  .977  1.056  1.116  .975
scale
(h)  t  value  of  .759  2.022*  4.08*  .800
test  for  returns
to  scale  dlfferent
from  1
*  Slgnificant  at  a  one-tailed  95  percent  confidence  level.
Notes:  General:  Other  variables  In the  equation  Include a constant,  village dummy
variables,  an  Indicator  for  production  problems  such  as  post,  and  human capital
(age,  education).  The parameters  are  not  presented.
(a)  Land  Is  measured  as  a  combined area  of  all  parcels,  adjusted  for  quality
differences  through  an  Index  based  on  parameters  from  a  hedonic  value
equation.
(b)  Capital Is measured as the  value of  cropping-related  equipment, machinery and
draft  aninals.
(c)  Labor  Is measured as  the  actual  days  applied,  with the  weights  of  1.0,  .75,.5
for  males, females,  and children  respectively.
(d)  Nitrogen  Is measured  as weight  of  pure  nutrient.
(e)  Welght of  manure.
(g)  Sum of  coefficients  (a)-(e).
(h)  Test  against  the  null  hypothesis  that  returns  to  scale  are  constant.- 25  -
mean  farm size (less than 1/3  hectare) has the highest estimated returns  to scale
(1.116).  In Jurong county  the returns  to  s  ale are  1.056.  These results  are
thus  compatible wlth the  observatlon  that  capital indivisibillty implies Increasing
returns  to  scale within a range of  smaller  farm sizes. 4 The demand  for  cropping-
related capital In the countles with very  small  farm sizes Is thus smaller
by  more than a  proportionate factor  as  compared  to  a hypothetical region with
Identical agro-clmatic conditlons but larger farm sizes.  Furthermore,  the estimated
productlon  elasticity  of  capital  In  the  two  counties  (Tal and  Jurong)  is  not
significantly  different  from zero.  This suggests a  low marginal productivity  of
capital In crop  production, apparently due to  the IndivisibIllty  of  capital and the
very small  size of  farms.
We  proceed next to  analyze the determinants of  Investment in productive
assets.  In order  to  allow for  a  better  correspondence between the  tenure
security  variables and  the  type  of  Investment considered, only  Investment In
cropping-related capital Is con3idered (e.g., livestock Is excluded). The estknated
model corresPonds to  the reduced form of  the system of  first-order  conditions
(6)  - (7)  as  swumarized  in Table 8, with modifications to  allow for  a  somewhat
richer  model.  One modification Is  the  Incluslon of  a  third  form  of  Investment,
namely,  non-crop-related  capital, In addition to  housing and crop-related  capital.
Its  effect  or  crop-related  Investment Is expected to  be In the same  directlon as
housng (i.e., positive).  While  values of  housing In the beginning  of  the perlod (Ho
In the notation of  the preceding section) were not available,  Indicators of  housing
quality In 1982 were used to  construct  a composite Index of  Initial house quality.
4 A study employing  province level time serles data for  the period 1984-1988 obtained an
estimate of  returns  to  scale of  1.07.  See Lin (1989).- 26  -
Other modificatlons Involve the  Incluslon of  several  household characteristics:
Family  size  adds to  housing demand  and Is  thus  expected to  negatively affect
productive  Investment.  The  number of  adults  (proxi  for  household labor
endowment)  reduces the demand  for  hired labor and thus releases more liquldity
for  productive Investment  when  credit Is a binding constraint.  Two variables wvere
incorporated in the analysis to represent human  capital:  Education and experience
In agriculture.  The latter  variable Is significantly correlated  with age, and may
thus represent  several factors  wlth differing  Impacts on Investment (e.g., older
farmers may be less inclined to  Invest).  Farm  size was adjusted  for  land quality
differences  through a hedonic quallty index.  A coefficlent  greater  than 1 would
imply Increasing capital/land ratlos.
The probability of land loss Is represented by two Indlcators of confidence
In the  present  land aliocation system constructed  from farmers' perceptlons as
reported  In section Ill.  One Indicator relates to  perceived likelihood of  contract
disruption In the short  term, while the other refers  to  the likelihood of  retalning
the  same farm In the  ionger-run.  Both Indicators were constructed  as  dummy
variables where the value 1 implles  more tenure security and 0 impiles  less tenure
security,  thus  the  expected  sign  Is  positive  If  land  tenure  considerations
significantly affect  Investment.
Given  the segmentation of  formal and Informal credit markets as discussed
In section  Ill, a  distinction  was made In the empirical analysis between the  two
types of  credit,  so as to  test  whether they have separate effects  on different
Investments.  Specifically, informal credit  Is not  expected to  significantly affect
productive investment, as It Is not  typically provided for  such purposes and It Is
mostly not fungible.  Because Institutional credit Is mostly short-term,  the average- 27  -
annual institutlonal borrowing by  the household  was utilized In the analysis, while
for  Informal credit  the  cumulative amount for  the  period was used.  A positive
coefficient  Is expected If credit  is a binding constraint.
Two sets  of  estimates were obtained:  OLS regresslons of  crop-related
capital  stock,  and  Tobit  estimates  of  Investment In  housing.  The  capital
regresslons, reported In Table 10, Indicate that the stock of capltal increases with
farm size (parameters In all countles are slgnificantly greater  than zero at  a 95
percent  one talled confidence level).  Only In the case of  Gongzhuling  does the
capital/land ratlo  increase with farm size, as the coefficient  of  land Is greater
than  1.  However,  one cannot reject  the hypothesis that the capital/land ratio Is
fixed In Gongzhullng,  ceterls  paribus (i.e., that  the coefficient  of  land Is equal
to  1).  Similarly,  In Tal county  the hypothesis that  the coefficient  of  land Is one
cannot  be rejected.  In Jurong and Xiajlang counties,  the  coefficients  of  land
are significantly less than 1, indicating that  larger farms have lower capital/land
ratios.  This may be due to  supplies of  rationed variable Inputs (e.g. fertilizers)
Increasing less  than  proportlonately  with farm size,  or  due  to  less  than  full
utilizatlon of  capital (  a consequence  of  indivisibillty).  The latter  explanation Is
compatible with  the  non-significant  production  elasticity  of  capital  In  Jurong
county.
Informal credit  does not  affect  Investment In crop-related  capital In any
of  the counties (none of  the estimated parameters are statistically  significant at
the  95 percent  confidence lovel).  This Is compatible  with the  segmentation anu
lack  of  fungibility  characterizing  this  source  of  funding.  Formal credit
significantly and positively affects  Investment  In farm capital In Gongzhuling  county,- 28  -
Table  10:  Regresslons  of  Crop  Related Capital  Stock
Variable  a\County  Gongzhuling  Jurong  Tal  Xiajiang
(N-200)  (N-190)  (N-200)  (N-196)
I.  Farm Size  1.548  .383  .560  .452
(4.491)  (2.288)  (1.795)  (3.264)
II.  Credit
Formal credit  .170  -.004  .001  .004
(2.068)  (.950)  (.024)  (.138)
Informal  credit  .035  .001  .021  .025
(.891)  (.079)  (.680)  (1.917)
III.  Security  Perceptions
Confidence  In short-term  -.121  .173  -.359  .174
(.310)  (1.013)  (1.136)  (1.546)
Confidence  In long-term  .382  .083  -.108  .015
(.910)  (.499)  (.317)  (.132)
IV.  Initial  Capital  Stocks
Crop  related  capital  .182  .214  .256  .230
(1.980)  (3.800)  (2.549)  (3.492)
Non-crop  capital  .060  -.044  .098  -.015
(.672)  (.768)  (1.054)  (.205)
Housing  quality  -.219  -.160  .107  -.015
(1.446)  (1.298)  (1.103)  (.190)
V.  Household Characteristics
Family size  .143  .234  .625  .239
(.240)  (.711)  (1.433)  (1.322)
No. of  adults  .052  .344  .226  .202
(.112)  (1.159)  (.635)  (1.424)
Education  .026  .017  -.015  -.023
(.449)  (.742)  (.489)  (1.547)
Experlence  .001  .001  .002  -.009
(.725)  (.725)  (.307)  (1.996)
R2  .446  .290  .616  .523
a/  A  constant  trm  and  village  dummy variables  were  also  Included  In  each
regression,  but  are  not  reported  here.  Regresslons  follow  a  double
logarithmic  speciflcatlorn.  Sample slzes  differ  due  to  missing observations.- 29  -
Table  11:  Proportion  of  Farmers with Unsatisfled
Input  Demand (Percent)
County  Gongzhullng  Jurong  Tal  Xiajlang
Input  (N-200)  (N-1 99)  (N-200)  (N-200)
Fertilizer  10  54  14  23
Diesel  10  33  29  67
Pesticides  1  32  23  23
Herbicides  1  28  26  29
Note:  The numbers show the  percentages  of  respondents  who stated  tsat  they
were  not  able  to  obtaln  the  desired  quantities  of  Inputs  even  though  they  were
willing to  pay  higher  than  market  prices.
Source:  Feder  et  al.,  1990.
where Input  supply  problems are  negligible and farm  sizes  are  larger.  In the  other
three  counties  formal  credit  does  not  significantly  affect  Investment,  and It would
thus  seem  that  generally  credit  was  not  a  binding  constralnt  on  crop-related
Investment  In these  counties.  In Tal and  Jurong  counties,  demand for  Investment
has  likely  been  low due  to  the  low marginal productivity  of  capital  and small farm
sizes.  In Xlajlang county  farm sizes  are  larger,  but  Inadequate  Input  supplies  are
a serous  problem, apparently  diminishing the  profitability  of,  and hence the  demand
for,  farm  capital.
Concerns  regarding  land  reallocation  did not  hinder  productive  Investment
signlficantly  (none  of  the  coefficients  are  statistically  significant).  This  Is,
apparently  because  farmers  expected  (at  least  at  the  time of  the  survey)  that  the- 30  -
general  household responsibillty  productlon  mode will  prevail,  and  may have
perceived the transaction costs  of  capital stock  adjustment which  will be Incurred
upon reallocatlon to  be minor.
The parameter of  the initial stock  of  capital Is significantly greater  than
zero and smaller  than 1 In all counties.  Other variables In the equations, however,
are not  significantly greater  than zero.
Tobit estimates of  the parameters of  demand  for  housing Investment are
presented  In  Table  12.  In  all  counties  the  parameter of  Informal credit  Is
slgnificantly related to housing Investment, implying  that  the availability of  Informal
credit  was a binding  constraint  on housing Investment.  In Xlajlang county  formal
credit was also a significant factor  affecting  housing investment, and In all other
counties  the parameters of  formal credit  are positive, although not  statistically
slgnificant.  Tenure security perceptlons do not affect  housing  Investment, except
In Xlajiang county,  where a counter-intuitive  sign Is observed for  the long term
tenure  security  Indicator.  As  expected,  initial housing quality  Is  significantly
negataively related  to housing Investment (except In Xlajlang county).  Education
Is  positively  related  to  housing Investment In three  of  the  counties,  perhaps
because It  Is  a  proxi  for  political  status  and better  access  to  constructlon
materlals.- 31  -
Table  12:  Tobit  Estimates  of  Investment  In Housing
Varlable  a\County  Gongznuling  Jurong  Tal  Xlajlang
(N-200)  (N-190)  (N-200)  (N.195)
I.  Farm Slze  8.890  -67.539  226.978  52.380
(.210)  (.486)  (.778)  (.445)
II.  Credit
Formal credit  .612  6.843  2.965  4.559
(1.037)  (1.324)  (.329)  (2.666)
Informal  credit  .803  1.338  1.537  3.369
(3.272)  (5.200)  (5.241)  (7.664)
IlI.Security  Perceptions
Conf.  In  -763.506  -550.699  1233.640  -1613.080
short-term  (.802)  (1.407)  (.432)  (1.256)
Conf.  In  46.281  -856.118  -1570.250  3584.130
long-term  (.046)  (1.030)  (1.187)  (2.886)
IV.nitlal  Capital  Stocks
Crop  related  capital  .008  -.731  11.811  1.770
(.016)  (.882)  (1.517)  (2.100)
Non-crop  capital  7.219  .981  -1.379  4.449
(5.109)  (.693)  (.617)  (1.583)
Housing  quality  -1890.98  -1195.130  -1140.37  -948.705
(4.710)  (1.963)  (2.822)  (1.148)
V.  Household Characteristics
Family size  87.323  162.489  571.999  265.222
(.242)  (.390)  (1.269)  (.616)
No. of  adults  25.197  752.566  -230.057  -89.100
(.069)  (1.697)  (.501)  (.203)
Educatlon  257.485  -209.292  400.977  353.298
(1.873)  (1.826)  (3.019)  (2.172)
Experlence  -18.805  -29.328  -13.975  -29.625
(.589)  (.960)  (.407)  (.585)
Log-likelihood  -1198.8  -957.2  -1374.3  -942.10
a/  A constant  term  and village  dummy variables  were  Included  In each  equation.
sample sizes  differ  due  to  missing observations.- 32  -
VIL  SUMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
The data  and analysis  presented  In the  preceding  sectlons,  while pertalning
to  only  four  counties  within  China,  generate  plausible  conclusions  with  likely
applicability  to  other  areas.  The  data  confirm  the  well  established  upsurge  In
acqulsition  of  consumer  durables  and  residential  Investment  In rural  areas.  It  Is
also  demonstrated  that  productive  Investment  was  substantially  lower  than
Investment  In housing,  ralsing  the  question  of  whether  there  were  factors  which
Inhibit  productive  Investment,  thereby  encouraging  other  Investments.  Possible
constraints  which were  suggested  by  scholars  of  Chinese agriculture  Include the
small farm  sizes,  Insecure  land  tenure  and  Inadequacy  of  financial  arrangements.
All of  these  potential  constraints  can be  neutralized  through  policy,  but  any  policy
change Involves  direct  and Indirect  costs,  and It Is therefore  Important  to  Identify
which of  the  constraints  are  actually  significant  and  under  what  circumstances.
The analysis  shows  that  the  extremely  small size  of  farms  In some areas
could  become a  factor  hindering  Investment  and  productivity,  as  the  Indivisibillty
of  capital  Introduces  Increasing  returns  to  scale.  The emergence of  some forms
of  customized  draft  services  or  shared ownership of  capital  assets  has apparently
not  been  sufficient  to  overcome  the  problem  of  Indivisibility.  The  Impact  of
Increasing  returns  to  scale  has not  been reflected  In the  Investments  in the  areas
characterized  by  very  small farm  sizes,  because  other  Inputs  (e.g.,  fertilizers,
dlesel,  herbicides)  are  possibly  rationed  In a  manner not  proportionate  with  farm
size,  or  because  capital  Is  underutilized  In areas  where most  farms  are  below  a
threshold  size.  If,  however,  the  problem  of  supplementary  Inputs  supplies  Is
rectified  (e.g.  by  Introducing  market  mechanisms to  the  distribution  system),  then- 33  -
a  likely  outcome  Is  an  Investment pattern  where  larger  farms  have  higher
capital/land  ratlos,  unless  the  availability  of  financing  becomes  a  binding
constralnt.  Under circumstances of  inadequate  variable  Input  supplies,  the
depressed  demand for  capital  Is  reflected  in  a  lower  demand for  credit.
Consequently,  In the three study areas where Input supply problems  were severe,
credit was not  a factor  inhibiting Investment In crop-related  farm capital.  In the
one  province  wlth  adequate  Input  supplies,  crop-related  Investment  was
constrained by  the supply of  Institutional credit.  In such an area, the estimates
suggest  that  a doubling of  the  volume  of  Institutional  credit  (which Is officially
Intended mostly for  financing of  current  inputs) would increase capital stocks by
17 percent.  An Increase of  one dollar In the availability of  formal credit  to  an
average household  would lead to  40 cents of  additlonal Investment.
Insecurity of  land tenure, stemming  from the absence of  private ownership
and apprehension regarding disruption of  the existing  land allocation, does not
appear to  have been a  significant  factor  affecting  Investments before  1989.
However,  as current  land contracts  were awarded  for  15 years, Investments  In the
years past the mid-point of  contract  maturity (I.e., towards the mid  90's) may be
more sensitive to  perceptions regarding land reallocatlon.  Since the data  show
that  the majority of  farmers think It  Is likely that  they will not  be allocated the
same parcels of  land upon contract  maturity, this  Issue Is potentially significant
and requires remedial  policy (e.g., by extending  current contract  maturities several
years before  they expiro).
A reform In the Input supply system Is likely to  Increase the  demand  for
Investment, and credit  may therefore  become a constralnt  In areas where It  Is
presently  not  Inhlbiting Investment.  The institutlonal  credit  system Is  highly- 34  -
centralized and controlled (although reforms are belng gradually Introduced), and
a market-Induced supply response Is not  likely.  The non-Institutional  credit
market Is hlghly segmented.  For agricultural households,  most Informal credit  Is
obtained from relatives and friends, and Is not  available  for  farm Investment. An
Institutional  credit  expansion will likely need to  augment an Input  supply policy
reform to  facilitate  both Increased Input use and Increased farm Investment.
Farm  size Is a factaor  limiting  Investment  In areas where farms are extremely
small.  Solutions in the form of  forced  consolidatlon have serious  repercusslons
(e.g. undermining  of  tenure  security perceptlons).  If  consolidatlon also Involves
some forms of  recollectivization, then serious  Incentive problems will re-emerge,
with  significant  productivity  losses  (Lin,  1990).  Similarly, publicly  maintained
equipment  rental or custom services have a mixed  record In other countries.  The
Increased supply of  mechanized  equipment designed for  small scale  farms may
alleviate some  of  the farm scale problems. Market-induced farm consolidation  may
emerge  If  alternative employment  In the rural sector  becomes  an attractive  option
for  agricultural households  and If constraints  to labor mobility  are removed. Such
a process would require the elkninatlon  of  various bureaucratic obstacles to  land
market transactions.  Thus, while rental of  land Is now allowed  among  Individuals,
the  actual legal and bureaucratic mechanisms  to  facilitate  efficlent  land markets
have not been Implemented,  and apprehension  regarding land contract  cancellation
upon renting-out  may still be a factor.- 35  -
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